This paper compares income inequality and income mobility in the Scandinavian countries and the United States during the 1980's. The results demonstrate that inequality is greater in the United States than in the Scandinavian countries and that the ranking of countries with respect to inequality remains unchanged when the accounting period of income is extended from one to 11 years. The pattern of mobility turns out to be remarkably similar despite major differences in labor market and social policies between the Scandinavian countries and the United States.
different aspects of it".'
The discussion above demonstrates the importance of comparing income inequality across nations based also on longer time periods than one year and for comparing income mobility along with income inequality across countries. As the LIS-project has demonstrated, attaining comparability in a single year is a time-consuming and demanding task. Doing so for multi-year studies has only rarely been attempted. 2 Using data based on income tax records for the Scandinavian countries and interview data for the United States, this study explores the following questions:
1. What is the ordering of countries with respect to income inequality and does this ordering change when the accounting period for income is lengthened from one to several years?
What is the ordering of countries with respect to income mobility?
We study these questions using longitudinal data sets from four countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United States. We study the income mobility of individuals by use of three income concepts: earnings, family market income and disposable family income. We observe the incomes from 1980 to 1990, as well as conducting some analyses on more complete data from 1986 to 1990.
The precise definitions of income concepts and population and time units are given in Section 2. Since country-specific micro data have been available we have been able to employ identical definitions of basic units. Indeed, our choices of definitions are to a large extent motivated by the need for comparability between the countries we study.
The paper is structured as follows. We discuss in Section 2 the nature of the problems involved in doing a cross-national comparison using longitudinal data and briefly present the data sets as well as the methods we use. In Section 3, we briefly sketch some relevant differences in the macroeconomic environment between the countries. Section 4 contains the results which are summarized and discussed in Section 5. ' See his contribution to the stimulating discussion of the issue in Krelle & Shorrocks (1978) . 
Data and methods

Data
There are a large number of specific choices to make in a study of this sort, in the making of which the need for similarity across countries has to be borne in mind. We need to specify the time period(s) to cover, the relevant income receiving unit (individual, family or household) and the appropriate unit of analysis (individual, family or household, again). We also need to decide on what income concepts to study, how to delimit and choose the populations to be researched, and, depending on what income and analysis units are chosen, we have to specify an (at least implicit) equivalence scale. Theory gives little guidance for choosing among alternatives. As most international comparisons of income inequality to date deal solely with comparisons of incomes over one year, we can not rely on an established tradition either.
Institutions differ between countries in ways that complicate all choices. For instance, how
should (and can) cohabiting couples be treated: as a married couple or as two um-elated individuals? To exemplify the difficulties one encounters in choosing among such alternative definitions in a cross-national study, consider the following. In Denmark and Norway, homosexual couples can enter a legal relationship, and should on at least as good grounds as cohabiting couples be treated as a family. However, in most countries we have no information about the relationship between two adults of the same sex who share their living arrangements. 3 The income concepts we use are described below. The most important difference to some common practices is that we gross count capital income instead of subtracting interest paid on loans. We have also settled for including all work-related social transfers in earnings. Public sector transfers that are not work-related, but either universal or means-tested are defined separately. 3 A few words on the process we used to arrive at the particular choices might illuminate issues. The authors of this paper have convened for three meetings to discuss the definitions to be used, each time iterating between what we wanted to do and what we could do, given the constraints of the particular data sets to be used. It is in a study of this sort very important that income and other concepts are highly comparable. One therefore often has to back away from the ideal definitions to feasible ones, where feasibility is defined in terms of the least common denominator.
We study the distribution of: (1) earnings of those who had strictly positive earnings in every year;4 (2) the market income of individuals over the time period and (3) the disposable income of individuals. We define earnings (1) as the individuals' earnings plus work-related transfers, such as unemployment insurance, sick pay and part-time pensions. For (2) and (3), the unit of analysis is the individual but the income receiving unit is the family. Market income consists of factor incomes. Disposable income is (market income -taxes paid + (non-work-related social transfers excluding social assistance and income in-kind)). Again, the exclusion of certain transfers is datadriven. We study two time periods, namely period 1980 to 1990 (Period 1) and the period 1986 to 1990 (Period 2).
We have chosen to assign the market (and disposable) income per adult member to the individuals we study, rather than to assign a (conventional) equivalent income (defined over all members in the household), i.e., for a married couple, we divide the sum of each spouse's market (disposable) income by two and assign the resulting number to each spouse. The "family" we define as consisting of the head and the spouse, if they are married, and as the individual in all other cases.
We ignore income from other household members, adults and children alike. This means that we also ignore the income of the partner in a co-habiting couple. This is a choice that is dictated by the need for comparability across countries.
Our choice not to use an equivalence scale -other than that implied by the procedure aboveis in part practical and in part a principle. A choice of some particular equivalence scale involves well-known problems (see, e.g., Jenkins & Lambert (1993) ). The main reason, however, is that we are not always able to find out the structure of the household an individual lives in. For some countries, for some years, we do not know the number of children in the household, nor do we know the number of other adults. We have, therefore, settled for the somewhat unsatisfactory and pragmatic solution, described above. For the period 1986 to 1990, we could partially adjust for family size. However, in order to preserve comparability with the longer time period, we use the same procedure there.
There is another way of viewing this problem. Use of an equivalence scale is motivated by the wish to compare levels of welfare across households with different structures ("needs" ). Thus, to compare mobility in equivalent income is to aspire to compare mobility in welfares. While this is interesting in its own right, we have here settled for comparing the mobility in incomes, i.e., mobility in money that accrues to the adult members of the household. Note also, that to be able to interpret mobility in equivalent income as mobility in welfares, one has to have a high degree of confidence that the equivalence scale used is, indeed, the correct and true one. To put it mildly, such a consensus can not be found in the literature.
Negative disposable or market incomes are censored at zero in each year.5 The proportions of zero and negative incomes (available from the authors on request) vary somewhat from country to country and by income concept but are at the very largest below 5 percent. All incomes are expressed in 1990 prices in each country's own currency, using the consumer price indices. Since it is income inequality, rather than the level of living we are comparing we have not used any method for converting domestic currencies into comparable units.
The cohorts that we study are as follows. In the first period we study individuals born between 1927 and 1951. The youngest sample members are 29 in 1980 and the oldest are 63 in 1990. In the second period, we include persons born between 1927 and 1961, which makes the age range 25 to 63. These choices are primarily to enable the study of the working-age population, those expected to be responsible for their standard of living. Also, we want to use consistent age groups within each of the two time periods. For all samples we only include those who lived in the country during the whole period.
When comparing the results reported here with the results of other studies, differences in choices of definitions should be borne in mind. Note also that this study differs from the conventional income inequality study in that we also report standard errors for our estimated Gini coefficients. A prominent example is the Gird coefficient which is employed in this study. The Gini coefficient G is related to the Lorenz curve L in the following way:
Detailed data descriptions
Denmark
The normative implications of using the Gini coefficient have been discussed by, e.g., Sen (1973) and Yaari (1988) .
In general, income inequality may be expected to decrease when the length of the accounting period is increased. The extent to which inequality decreases will depend on the frequency of shifts Female labour force participation
1976-1990
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• There were major differences in unemployment dynamics between the Scandinavian countries.
In Sweden, where unemployment remained low throughout the period covered by the present study, the inflow rate to unemployment was very low while the outflow rate was only slightly lower than in After this discussion of potentially important factors in explaining differences in income inequality and mobility in the four countries, we proceed in the next section to our empirical results.
Results
Main results
We start the presentation of our results by looking at inequality of annual incomes. Table A 2).
In both periods and with all three income concepts, the United States has much higher inequality than the Scandinavian countries. For earnings, the difference in the Ginis between United
States and the Scandinavian countries exceeded 0.1 during the years 1980-1990 (Figure 2(a) ).
The differences are of comparable orders of magnitude for disposable income and market income. 8
There is also a marked trend in inequality of all income concepts. 9 Both of these findings are in line with earlier research and lend credibility to our choices of populations and income concepts;
e.g., the discrepancy between the United States on one hand and Sweden and Norway on the other has been found in analyses of the LIS data (see e.g. Atkinson et al. (1995)). That inequality increased substantially in the United States throughout the 1980s is well established.
81n judging whether these differences are "small" or "large", the reader can use the property that the Gini coefficient equals half the expected percentage difference between two randomly drawn individuals in the population.
9In looking at the trend in earnings inequality in the United States, it should be recalled that our sample is very different from commonly used samples. In particular, the fact that we include both men and women, and restrict the analysis to those who had positive earnings in every sample year, leaves us with a sample that is quite different from commonly used samples, that are cross sections (disregarding the restriction to a balanced panel) or restricted to men. 
(a) Earnings
Gini coefficient of market income Sweden is higher than in the United States. Turning to Table 2(b), we can see that the mobility indices, as expected, are lower for the shorter period. The mobility order of countries is consistent with the long period, in the sense that the countries that were ordered using data from Period 1 are not re-ordered in Period 2 -e.g., Sweden is more mobile on market income than the United States, which in turn is more mobile on market and disposable income than Denmark. The estimated mobility indices for Period 2 suggest that the United States has less mobility than Sweden and Norway, followed only by Denmark.
We are somewhat surprised to see that mobility in the distribution of disposable income is higher than in that of market income for all countries, except the United States, in both periods.
We had expected that the "welfare state" in terms of taxes and transfers would smooth income over longer periods and thus reduce mobility even more for disposable income than for market income. In the light of these results, this does not appear to be the case. To understand this particular aspect of our results requires further study. One possible reason could be that we do not adjust incomes to reflect changes in, e.g., the number of children living in the household.
Sensitivity analyses
There is always a risk in a study of this type that the conclusions are sensitive to some specific choices. Given the large number of choices to be made, it is for all practical purposes infeasible to examine the effect of altering these choices on the conclusions. Thus, we have chosen to study whether a few specific issues, if handled differently, would lead us to draw different conclusions. We deal with each of these questions in turn.
There are larger inter-country differences in the patterns of female than in male labour force participation. These differences affect both inequality and mobility. Given the restriction that only those with positive earnings in every year will be included in the sample, different kinds of public policies will exclude different types of persons. For instance, compare two high-earning women in Sweden and the United States, who receive the same wage in every year they are employed.
The American woman is on maternal leave for three months following the birth of a child, an event which will be associated with some earnings mobility. The Swedish woman again might be on maternal leave for more than a year, an event which will exclude her from the sample. It is difficult to disentangle such effects from other types of mobility. Instead of attempting to control for different sources of mobility, we compare the mobility of male earnings in the four countries, a comparison that in our view is less sensitive to the interaction of inter-country differences in work-related public policies and our sample selection criteria. In Table 3 we show the inequality and mobility indices of earnings estimated only for males. The results are quite striking. The ranking of countries by earnings inequality is similar to that found for the sample of all positive wage earners; except that for men, earnings are more equal in Norway than in Sweden. The ordering of countries with respect to mobility is perhaps more interesting.
It turns out that male earnings in the United States are less mobile than those in Denmark and
Norway in both time periods, whilst Sweden turns out to have slightly lower earnings mobility than the United States.
We were surprised by the fact that the mobility of both market and disposable income were so high in Sweden. One possible explanation could be that cohabitation without formal marriage is fairly common in Sweden, as also in the other Scandinavian countries. Our choice to restrict the pooling of husband's and wife's income to legally married couples and treat two cohabiting persons as forming two families would tend to overstate income inequality and mobility." We are able to experiment with a broader definition of the family, namely we are able to treat those cohabiting couples as married who have at least one common child who is under the age of 18 (Swed. samtaxerade). In the second half of the 1980s, the "marriage rate" tips formed was 3-4 percentage points higher than the rate of formal marriages.
As can be seen in Table 4 , our estimated mobility patterns for Sweden are affected very little by this experiment. Estimated mobility indices for market income differ only at the third decimal number from our main results in Table 2 . Mobility of disposable income turns out to be slightly higher than what was found for our main sample. However, no re-ranking of Sweden follows from these sensitivity analyses. Table 4 The sensitivity of average inequality and mobility in Sweden to changes in the definition of marital status The results, reported in Table 5 Further, we estimate the inequality and mobility indices for both of these variables for the sample as defined "normally", i.e., including both men and women, and for the sample consisting solely of men. The results for annual inequality are shown in Figure 3 and for mobility and inequality of average income in Table 6 . We should emphasize, however, what we believe is an important finding. Recall that one of the typical points of departure in studies of income inequality over longer time periods and income mobility is that a traditional defense of high income inequality is that it is the flip-side of high mobility. We find no evidence of a positive relationship between inequality on the one hand and mobility on the other. Although the reverse finding does not emerge either, we find this lack of a pattern an important finding in itself. 
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